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Abstract: We present models for competition among multiple suppliers for demand from a single
manufacturer. The suppliers produce to stock a single product and are allocated demand by the
manufacturer based on the amount the amount of inventory they hold. We prove the existence of a
Nash equilibrium for a broad class of market allocation schemes. For the special case of identical
suppliers under either a stock-proportional or fill rate-proportional allocation, we show the uniqueness
of the Nash equilibrium. Analysis of the Nash equilibrium for this case reveals that (a) the
manufacturer benefits from competition (in the form of higher fill rates), (b) the manufacturer benefits
more from a stock-proportional allocation than a fill rate-proportional allocation, and (c) the
manufacturer benefits the most when the number of suppliers is two.

1 Introduction
In many industries, original equipment manufacturers (OEM) are turning to outsourcing as an
alternative to in-house manufacturing. This trend is particularly evident in the electronics industry
where the contract manufacturing sector is now a $180 billion industry and expected to represent over
50% of all electronics manufacturing by 2005 (Kador, 2001). One of the decisions that an OEM has to
make is how much of their manufacturing they should outsource and to whom they should outsource
it. In the electronics industry, there are numerous contract manufacturers with nearly similar
capabilities. The issue for an OEM is then whether to outsource to a single supplier or to allocate
demand among multiple ones. There is an increasing consensus that multiple sourcing is beneficial to
the OEM’s by creating redundancy in their supplier lines and encouraging price and service among
their suppliers. However, with multiple sourcing, the OEM’s must determine how demand should be
allocated among the multiple suppliers.
In this paper, we explore inventory-based competition as a mechanism for the manufacturer to allocate
demand among a set of potential suppliers. In particular, the manufacturer rewards suppliers that hold
more inventory (provide a higher service level) with a higher market share. We assume that the
suppliers adjust their capacity proportionally to the amount of market share they are allocated. The
suppliers earn revenue per unit supplied to the manufacturer and incur holding and backordering costs.
Demand at the manufacturer occurs one unit at a time. The probability that a particular supplier is
allocated the order is determined by their market share allocation. The suppliers manage their
inventory using a base-stock policy, with these base-stock levels defining the competitive strategy of
each supplier.

In this paper, we prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium for a broad class of market allocation
schemes. For the special case of identical suppliers under either a stock-proportional or fill rateproportional allocatin, we show the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Analysis of the Nash
equilibrium for this case reveals that (a) the manufacturer benefits from competition (in the form of
higher fill rates), (b) the manufacturer benefits more from a stock-proportional allocation than a fill
rate-proportional allocation, and (c) the manufacturer benefits the most when the number of suppliers
is two.
Our work is related to the growing body of research on inventory-based competition. Examples
include Parlar (1988), Karjalainen (1992), Lippman and McCardel (1997), Mahajan and Van Ryzin
(2001), and Wang and Gerchack (2001). For a recent review and additional references see (Cachon
2003).

2 Model Description
There are N suppliers who produce a single product in a make-to-stock fashion using a base-stock
policy. The suppliers compete for a fixed market share from a single manufacturer. Market share is
allocated so as to reward suppliers that hold more inventory (market share is non-decreasing in the
supplier’s base-stock level). The suppliers are free to choose their stocking levels and incur inventory
holding and backordering costs. In response to a market share allocation, the suppliers increase their
capacity proportionally to maintain a fixed target utilization ρi, where 0 = ρi = ρo < 1 and ρo is
exogenously set by the manufacturer. Each supplier i incur a holding cost hi per unit of inventory per
unit time and a backorder cost bi per unit backordered per unit time, a production ci per unit produced,
and a capacity cost ki per unit of capacity (measured in terms of the associated production rate). The
supplier’s revenue has a fixed component and a variable component. The fixed component, gi, is
guaranteed revenue for agreeing to be a supplier. The variable component, pi, is earned per actual unit
supplied. Demand at the manufacturer occurs according to a Poisson process with rate λ. The fraction
of demand allocated to supplier i is denoted by αi, where 0 = αi = 1 and α1 + α 2 + ..., α N = 1 . The
parameter αi can be viewed as the probability that incoming demand is allocated to supplier i.
Although a truly probabilistic allocation is unlikely in practice, it is useful in approximating the
behavior of a central dispatcher that attempts to adhere to a specified market share for each supplier. It
is also useful in modeling settings where demand arises from a sufficiently large number of sources.
The variable αi corresponds in that case to the fraction of demand sources (e.g., geographical
locations) that are always satisfied from supplier i. Production times at each supplier are exponentially
distributed with rate µi = αiλ/ρi. Finished goods at the suppliers are managed according to a base-stock
policy with base stock level si (si = 0) at supplier i. This means that the arrival of demand at supplier i
always triggers a replenishment order with the supplier’s production system. Hence, the production
system at each supplier behaves like an M/M/1 queue.

3 The Supplier’s Problem
For a given market allocation αi and a base level si, the expected profit πi at each supplier i is given by
π i (α i , si ) = α i λ ( pi − ci ) + gi − ki µi − hi E ( I i ) − bi E ( Bi ) ; i=1,…, N,
(1)
where E(Ii) and E(Bi) denote respectively expected inventory level and expected backorder level at
supplier i. Under our assumptions, E(Ii) and E(Bi) are given by (see for example (Buzacott and
Shanthikumar, 1993)

ρi
ρ si +1
(2)
(1 − ρisi ) and E ( Bi ) = i ,
1 − ρi
1 − ρi
from which we can rewrite expected profit as
ρi
ρ si +1
.
(3)
π i (α i , si ) = α i λ ri + gi − hi ( si −
) − (hi + bi ) i
1 − ρi
1 − ρi
where ri = ( pi − ci ) − ki / ρi . Clearly, gi should satisfy the condition gi ≥ bi ρ i /(1 − ρi ) so that πi = 0 for
all values of si.
E ( I i ) = si −

For a fixed market allocation αi, the supplier’s problem can be stated as
maxsi π i (α i , si ) ;

(4)

The value of si, s , that maximizes πi, is given by s = 0 if αi = 0. Otherwise (if αi > 0), s is given by
n
i

n
i

n
i

hi

 ln[ β i b + h ]
h +b

i
i
if β i < i i
si n = 
ln ( ρ i )
hi

(5)
0,
otherwise,
where β i = −(1 − ρi ) / ρ i ln( ρi ) . The superscript n is used as mnemonic for no competition.
Substituting sin in the profit function, we obtain
ρ
π i (α i , sin ) = α i λ ri − hi [ sin − i (1 − β i )] + gi ,
(6)
1 − ρi
for i= 1, 2, …, N.

The value of sin can be usefully approximated by
ln[hi /(hi + bi )]
s%i =
,
ln ( ρi )

(7)

the solution to the difference equation π i (α i , si + 1) − π i (α i , si ) = 0. It can be shown that | sin − s%i | < 1
and sin / s%i → 1 as ρi → 1 , hence asymptotically exact. If the approximation sin ≈ s%i is used, we obtain
the simpler expression
π i (α i , sin ) ≈ α i λ ri − hi s%i + gi .
(8)

4 The Market Allocation
There are a variety of ways in which the manufacturer may allocate market share among the
competing suppliers to reward those that hold more inventory. We use the notation αi(s), where s = (s1,
s2, …, sN) to emphasize the dependence of αi on the vector s. We show that a Nash-equilibrium exists
under relatively mild assumptions about the allocation scheme. Specifically, we require that the
N
market share αi(s) of supplier i is increasing continuous and concave in si, and ∑ i =1α i ( si ) = 1 .
An example scheme that satisfies this assumption is one in which market share is allocated
proportionally to stocking levels. That is,
si
α i (s) =
.
(9)
si + ∑ j ≠ i s j
This allocation scheme has the advantage of being based on easily observable quantities and,
therefore, easy to implement and to enforce. It also arises naturally in other settings where, for
example, demand is stimulated by inventory – see Wang and Gerchack (2001). This scheme is not
however informative of the capabilities of the suppliers and, in particular, their abilities to guarantee a

certain level of service. An alternative to the stock-proportional scheme is therefore one proportional
to service levels, measured for example, by fill rates. In this case,
fi
α i (s) =
.
(10)
fi + ∑ j ≠i s j
Fill rate is the fraction of customer demand that is immediately met from stock. In our setting, by
virtue of the PASTA property, f i = Prob( I i > 0) = 1 − ρisi . It is not difficult to see that under this
scheme αi is both continuous, increasing and concave in si. This allocation scheme is in line with
commonly used contracts between suppliers and manufacturers. It also captures more of the
characteristics of the suppliers since it involves both stocking levels and capacity. See Boyaci and
Gallego (2002) for related discussion. An important question for the manufacturer is which of the two
schemes is more advantageous (for example, which of the two induces a higher fill rate for the
manufacturer?).

5 The Nash Equilibrium
The competition for market share among the suppliers defines a strategic game, where the players are
the N suppliers, the pure strategy space is the set of admissible base-stock levels si for each player i,
and the payoff function is the profit function πi(s) for player i for each profile s = (s1, s2, …, sN) of
strategies. Each player’s objective is to maximize their own profit function, given that each player has
full knowledge of the structure of the game. A Nash equilibrium for the competition among the
suppliers is any point (s1, s2,…, sN) such that none of the suppliers can increase their profit by
unilaterally changing their stocking levels. Therefore, to find an equilibrium point, it suffices to solve
N supplier problems (equation 2) simultaneously. To show the existence of a pure-strategy Nash
equilibrium, it is sufficient to show that (a) the strategy space for each player forms a nonempty
compact convex set and (b) the profit functions πi for each supplier i is continuous in s and concave in
si (see theorem 1.2 of (Fudenberg and Tirole 1991)).
Theorem 1: There exists a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for the game defined by the suppliers’
competition.
Proof: The profit function πi is continuous in s since αi (s) is continuous in s. Note that
∂ 2π i ∂ 2α i
ρ i si +1
2
=
λ
r
−
(
h
+
b
)
( ln ρi ) ≤ 0 .
i
i
i
2
2
∂Si
∂Si
1 − ρi
Hence, π i is concave. To show that the strategy space is continuous, convex and compact, we show
that the values of stocking levels from which each supplier chooses are restricted to the range [0, siu ],
where siu < 8 . To see this, we note that the profit of supplier i when they hold no inventory is given by

π i 0 ( s−i ) = α i0 ( s−i )λ ri where α i0 ( s−i ) = α i ( si = 0, s− i ) , where the notation s-i is used to denote the
strategy profile of the other suppliers. To show that the strategy space is bounded above by siu , it is
sufficient to show that if si > siu , then π i ( si , s− i ) ≤ α i0 ( s− i )λ ri . If we choose siu to be the solution of

λ ri + gi − hi EI i ( siu ) − bi EBi ( siu ) = 0 , then π i ( siu , s− i ) ≤ λ ri − hi EI i ( siu ) − bi EBi ( siu ) + gi ≤ π i0 ( s− i ). Noting
that the equation λ ri + gi − hi EI i ( siu ) − bi EBi ( siu ) = 0 admits a unique solution completes the proof.
Showing uniqueness of the equilibrium point without additional assumptions about the allocation
scheme is difficult. However, we can show that given a strategy profile s-i by the other suppliers,
supplier i has a unique optimum stocking level si* .

Proposition 1: For fixed s-i, there exists a unique optimum stocking level, si* , that maximizes the profit
of player i which satisfies the condition
h − θi ( si* )
ln[ βi i
]
hi + bi
∂α ( s , s )
h +b
*
si =
for hi − θi (0) < i i , and si* = 0 , otherwise, and θi ( si* ) = λ ri i i − i
.
ln( ρi )
∂si
βi
*
s =s
i

i

The proof is omitted for brevity and can be found in (Benjaafar et al. 2003). An important corollary of
this result, and of the fact θi ( si* ) > 0, is that si* > sin when si* > 0 , and si* = sin = 0 otherwise.
Corollary 1: Competition leads to higher base stock levels at each supplier and consequently to
higher fill rates.
If we restrict ourselves to either the stock- or fill rate-proportional allocation schemes described in
section 2 and if we limit ourselves to identical suppliers (i.e., hi = h, bi = b, ri = r, and ρi = ρ for i =1,
2, …, N) suppliers, then we can show that the Nash equilibrium is unique. The result is stated in the
following theorem and the proof can be found in (Benjaafar et al. 2003).
Theorem 2: In a system with N identical suppliers, under either a stock- or fill rate proportional
allocation scheme In a system with N identical suppliers, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium,
characterized by base-stock level si* = s* at each supplier that satisfies the following equation
h − θ ( s* )
s* = ln[ β
]/ ln( ρ ) .
h+b

5 Stock-Proportional versus Fill Rate-Proportional Market Allocation
In a system with identical suppliers, we show that an allocation proportional to base-stock levels leads
to higher fill rates than an allocation proportional to fill rates.
Theorem 3: Let fs and ff denote the Nash equilibrium fill rate under the stock proportional and fillrate proportional allocation schemes respectively, in a system with N identical suppliers, then fs = ff.
Proof: The Nash equilibrium solution under the stock-proportional and fill rate-proportional
allocations satisfy respectively the following equations:

fs = 1−

β 
( N − 1) ln(1 ρ ) 
h − λ r 2
,
h+b 
N ln(1 (1 − f s )) 

(11)

β 
( N − 1) ln(1 ρ ) (1 − f f ) 
h − λ r
.
h + b 
N2
f f 

(12)

and
f f =1−

Using the fact that for x<1, we have ln[1/(1 − x)] < x /(1 − x) , it is not difficult to show that f s > f f .
An intuitive explanation for this result is that a stock-proportional allocation is more sensitive to
changes in stocking levels than one proportional to fill-rates (the rate of increase of αi(si, s-i) in si for
fixed s-i is higher under a stock-proportional allocation). For manufacturers, this means that there is
value in constructing the terms of the competition to reward higher stocking levels than higher fill
rates.

6 The effect of Number of Suppliers
For N identical suppliers (N = 2) and a stock-proportional market share allocation, the equilibrium
base-stock level solves the following equation
h − θ ( s* )
s* = ln[ β
]/ ln( ρ ) ,
(13)
h+b
N −1
where in this case θ * ( s* ) = λ r 2 * , from which we can see that as N increases s* decreases. In the
N s
limit case, we have
h
lim N →∞ s* = ln[ β
]/ ln( ρ ) .
(14)
h+b
Note that this limit equilibrium base stock is the base stock level obtained in section 3 for the case of
no competition. A similar result can be obtained for the fill-rate proportional allocation.
Theorem 4: In a system with N identical suppliers, the equilibrium stocking level s* (and therefore
the equilibrium fill rate) are decreasing in N. As N → ∞ , s* → s n , the optimal stocking level without
competition.
Noting that when N = 1, s* = s n , the number of suppliers that maximizes the fill rate is 2. This means
that for manufacturers, the optimal number of suppliers is 2 (a duopoly).

6. Conclusion
In this paper, we present models for competition among multiple suppliers for market share from a
single manufacturer. The suppliers produce to stock a single product and are allocated demand by the
manufacturer based on the amount the amount of inventory they hold. We prove the existence of a
Nash equilibrium for a broad class of market allocation schemes. For the special case of identical
suppliers and either stock-proportional or fill rate-proportional allocations, we show the uniqueness of
the Nash equilibrium. Analysis of the Nash equilibrium for these cases reveals that (a) the
manufacturer benefits from competition (in the form of higher fill rates), (b) the manufacturer benefits
more from a stock-proportional allocation than a fill rate-proportional allocation, and (c) the
manufacturer benefits the most when the number of suppliers is two.
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